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COMMENTS
BAD HABITS: THE QUI TAM PROVISIONS OF
THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER ARTICLE II
Kathryn Feola*
"Bad habits are like a comfortable bed, easy to get into,
but hard to get out of."
INTRODUCTION
Born out of the intrinsic need to bolster an unsophisticated and
developing government, 2 the False Claims Act 3 ("FCA") is the primary
statute used by the government4 to prosecute and recoup money from any
person who submits false or fraudulent claims for reimbursement.' A key
component of the FCA is its qui tam provisions,6 which offers an
*J.D. January 2003, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law; M.S. Health Care Administration 1999, Marymount University; B.A. 1991,
George Mason University. The author wishes to thank Megan H. Tinker at
Proskauer Rose for her advice and support in writing this Comment.
1. Anonymous, at http://www.quoteland.com/topic.asp?CATEGORYID=71
(last visited October 8, 2002).
2 See United States ex rel. v. Schwartz, 546 F. Supp. 422,424 (N.D. Cal. 1982)
("[t]he original False Claims Act was passed in 1863 to aid the Government during
the Civil War. At that time there was not yet a Federal Bureau of Investigation
and the United States Attorney General's staff was quite modest.").
3. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000).
4. Richard Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 Wis. L. REV.
381, 381-82 (2001) (focusing on the government's initial right to intervene in the
litigation, not the issues that are raised when it does not).
5. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000). The FCA provides liability for any person who
"knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the
United States Government of a member of the Armed Forces of the United States
a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval." 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)
(2000). See also United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 551 (1943) (the
Supreme Court stated the purpose of the FCA "[is] to provide for restitution to
the government of money taken from it by fraud.").
6. Qui tam is the abbreviation for the Latin phrase "qui tam pro domino rege
quam pro se imposo sequitur," which literally means "who brings the action as well
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innovative method for Congress to employ the aid of private citizens in
administering federal statutory schemes.7
Under the FCA qui tam provisions private individuals, or relators,8 may
bring suit on behalf of the Government 9 against an individual or entity
who has allegedly defrauded the Government.' From Congress'
perspective, qui tam statutes are designed to encourage private citizens to
help the Executive Branch deter and redress violations of federal law." As
an incentive for bringing these suits, the individual is awarded a
percentage of the monetary recovery from the United States Treasury.1
2
Not surprisingly, qui tam relators generate the majority of civil fraud
recoveries under the FCA. 3
The health care industry has given the FCA a high degree of visibility. 4
In fact, FCA qui tam actions have been touted as the Government's main
arsenal against fraud in the health care industry." To date, health care
for the king as for himself. United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal
Hosp., 196 F.3d 514, 517 n.3 (5th Cir. 1999), rev'd en banc, 252 F.3d 749, 752 (5th
Cir. 2001)(citations omitted).
7. Evan Caminker, Comment, The Constitutionality of Qui tam Actions, 99
Yale L.J. 341 (1989) [hereinafter The Constitutionality of Qui tam Actions].
8. Jack Meyer, et. al., Reducing Health Care Fraud: An Assessment of the
Impact of the False Claims Act, 26 (Sept. 2001) at http://www.taf.org/
publications/pdf/reducing.pdf [hereinafter Reducing Health Care Fraud].
9. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2000).
10. Id. See discussion infra Part I for a further description of the FCA qui tam
provisions and requirements.
11. The Constitutionality of Qui tam Actions, supra note 7, at 344.
12. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)-(2) (2000). See also 144 CONG. REC. S 7675 (daily ed.
July 8, 1998) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
13. Reducing Health Care Fraud, supra note 8, at 34.
14. Id. at 18. Health care fraud became an important issue after the Medicare
and Medicaid programs were enacted in 1965. LINDA A. BAUMANN, HEALTH
CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE: PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVES 199 (2000). When these
programs were enacted, federal and state governments became purchasers of
health care services. Id.
15. The constitutional issues surrounding the qui tam provisions of the FCA
allowing a private individual to litigate a federal statute are critical to the health
care industry. Unlike government contractors who may submit several bills over
the course of a year, health care providers generally submit a large number of
small bills. For example, hospitals and other health systems file, in aggregate,
approximately 200,000 Medicare claims a day. See 144 CONG. REC. S 434 (daily ed.
March 19, 1998) (statement of Rep. McCollum). Under the Act, practitioners
stand to lose $5,000 to $10,000 per claim, plus three times the amount of damages
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related FCA cases have accounted for nearly half - approximately forty-
one percent - of the total civil fraud recoveries by the Government.' 6 In
fiscal year 2000 alone, the Government recovered $1.5 billion, comprising
over half of the total recoveries from health-related FCA cases. 7
Americans have a vested interest in protecting the national treasury
against fraud. However, some constitutional issues surrounding the
current FCA qui tam provisions remain unsettled.' 8 Among the most
controversial qui tam provisions are those that allow private parties to
litigate 9 without any government participation or guidance.20  Similar
arguments have arisen regarding the qui tam provisions that allow the
judiciary to prevent the Executive Branch from intervening in qui tam
litigation.2'
The constitutional issues surrounding FCA qui tam litigation can be
classified into three categories:22 1) whether vesting relators with the
power to prosecute qui tam actions violates Article II's Appointments
Clause; 3 2) whether delegating prosecutorial functions to private persons
violates Article II's Take Care Clause24; and 3) whether qui tam relators
meet Article III's standing requirement to bring suit in federal court.5
sustained by the government. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000). The pure number of
claims multiplied by the damages can easily amount to financial devastation.
16. Reducing Health Care Fraud, supra note 8, at 11.
17. Id. at 9.
I& See United States ex rel. Friedman v. Rite Aid Corp., 152 F. Supp. 2d 766,
770 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (noting the constitutional issues regarding the FCA have not
yet been resolved although to date they have withstood scrutiny).
19. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (2000).
20. Id.
21. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (2000) ("If the Government elects not to proceed
with the action . . . the court . . . may nevertheless permit the Government to
intervene at a later date upon a showing of good cause."). See also discussion infra
at 7.
22. A new constitutional challenge to the FCA has recently gained
momentum. In United Sates v. Mackaby, 261 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 2001), the
Ninth Circuit ruled that FCA civil penalties and treble damages have punitive, not
just remedial, purposes. As a result, these fines must be examined under the
Eighth Amendment's ban on excessive fines.
23. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
24. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
25. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 787-88 (2000)(holding
FCA qui tam relators have standing to sue in federal court).
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These three issues arose following the 1986 amendments to the FCA,
which significantly revitalized
26 the qui tam provisions of the Act.
2"
Nonetheless, prior to 1999, all circuit courts that addressed the issue
upheld the constitutionality of the FCA qui tam provisions under Article
II challenges.28 It was not until late 1999, when a three-judge panel in the
Fifth Circuit issued an unprecedented decision in United States ex rel.
Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital,29 creating a split among the circuits.
In Riley,0 the Fifth Circuit panel highly scrutinized the FCA31 and held
that qui tam provisions violate the Take Care Clause of Article 11.32 The
Riley opinion was the first to hold the FCA qui tam provisions, giving
private individuals the right to conduct litigation without federal
intervention, unconsitutional." Prior to Riley, a majority of the circuits
analyzing Article II arguments followed the lead of the Ninth Circuit's
decision in United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., which upheld the qui
tam provisions based on Article II challenges."
26. Reducing Health Care Fraud, supra note 8, at 28.
27. Id.
28. Prior to 1999, the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts
of Appeal ruled qui tam enforcement is constitutional. See Fraud and Abuse: Fifth
Circuit Rules Qui tam Enforcement Unconstitutional, Creates Circuit Split, infra,
note 31.
29. 196 F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 1999) rev'd en banc, 252 F. 3d 749 (5th Cir. 2001).
On April 1, 2002, the Southern District of Texas dismissed the case for failure to
state a claim pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). United States ex rel. Riley v. St.
Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6289 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
30. United States ex. rel. Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 196 F.3d 514, 517
(5th Cir. 1999), rev'd en banc, 252 F.3d 749,752 (2001).
31. Fraud and Abuse: Fifth Circuit Rules Qui tam Enforcement
Unconstitutional, Creates Circuit Split, Health Care Daily Report (BNA), Nov. 17,
1999.
32. Riley, 196 F.3d at 517. Riley, a nurse at St. Luke's brought her suit against
the hospital, under the qui tam provisions of the FCA. The federal government
declined to intervene. Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) Riley proceeded with the
suit on her own. The court found it unnecessary to address the Appointments
Clause issue based on its holding that the FCA qui tam provisions violate the Take
Care Clause. Riley, 196 F.3d at 531.
33. John Boese, Fraud Mail Alert No. 01-5-26, Civil False Claims Act: Fifth
Circuit En Banc Rules that Qui tam False Claims Act Enforcement Does Not
Violate Article II of the Constitution (May 26, 2002) at http://www.ffhsj.com/
wcc/frdarch/fm010526.htm.
34. 9 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 1993). For a detailed discussion of the Kelly holding, see
infra p. 16. See also Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. Stevens, 529 U.S 765 (2000)
(Shortly after the controversial Riley decision, the Supreme Court addressed
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This Comment addresses the constitutional infirmity of the FCA qui
tam provisions under Article II. Specifically, this Comment examines
whether the FCA violates the Appointments Clause and Take Care
Clause to the extent that the qui tam provisions vest prosecutorial
discretion in private citizens.
Part I provides an overview of the history of the False Claims Act,
reviews the specific FCA qui tam provisions and the significant
amendments to those provisions since the Act's inception. Part II looks at
the Article II separation of powers issues raised by the FCA qui tam
provisions. Part III examines the two most frequently raised violations
under the Take Care Clause and the Appointments Clause. Both of these
issues are examined in light of Kelly,35 which was one of the first cases to
address these issues under the FCA. This section criticizes the Kelly
court's analysis of Supreme Court precedent addressing the Take Care
Clause and the Appointments Clause. Part IV concludes that amending
the FCA to remove the unconstitutional provisions remains consistent
with the purpose behind the Act and will not dilute the benefits realized
by the federal treasury.
I. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
A. Historical Background
The significant monetary recoveries acquired under the FCA often over
shadow the simple fact that it was created long before any type of health
care industry developed.3 Qui tam actions originated in England around
the end of the thirteenth century to allow private individuals who had
suffered injury to bring actions "in the royal courts on both their own and
whether qui tam relators have Article III standing under the FCA. It held that
private relators have standing under Article III, however, the Court declined to
address the issue of whether these suits violate Article II's Appointments Clause
or the Take Care Clause).
35. 9 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 1993).
36. Joan H. Krause, Health Care Providers and the Public FISC: Paradigms of
Government Harm Under the Civil False Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REV. 121, 128
(2001) [hereinafter Health Care Providers and the Public FISC] (providing an
excellent discussion of FCA jurisprudence and current regulatory policy).
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on the Crown's behalf., 37 These legal actions were created at a time when
the legal machinery of the English government was still fairly primordial.38
Naturally, "the concept of qui tam [actions] migrated to this side of the
Atlantic along with other elements of English law and custom."3 9 In the
time period surrounding the framing of the Constitution, "qui tam actions
[were] prevalent in America"4 ° and were utilized "as a crucial buttress to
the government's ability to enforce the laws."4 ' As a result, the First
Congress enacted several statutes incorporating qui tam provisions. 2
B. Rights of the Parties in Qui Tam Actions
There are three interested parties in every qui tam case: (1) the United
States, (2) the qui tam relator(s), and (3) the defendant(s).4 3 Under the
FCA, virtually anyone can be a qui tam relator." To initiate a qui tam
lawsuit, the relator must file a complaint in camera and under seal with the
court.4 '5 The complaint remains under seal for sixty days in order to allow
the Government to evaluate the merits of the suit and determine "whether
it is in the Government's interest to intervene and take over the civil
action. ' At the close of the sixty-day period, the Attorney General must
notify the court as to whether the Government will proceed with the
action. 7
If the Government intervenes and proceeds with the case, it has the
primary responsibility for, and full control of the litigation, but the relator
37. See Vt. Agency Natural Res., 529 U.S. at 774 (citations omitted).
3& See Riley, 196 F.3d at 545 (5th Cir. 1999). Many of the early statutes were
simply informer laws that granted informers a reward but not a right to sue on
behalf of the government. Id. at 519.
39. Id. at 545.
40. Vt, Agency Natural Res., 529 U.S. at 775.
41. Riley, 196 F.3d at 546. See discussion infra at p. 7. The issue of using qui
tam statutes to buttress government enforcement is critical to future analysis of
present qui tam statutes. "As the federal government began to expand... the need
for private prosecution of law naturally waned." Riley, 196 F.3d at 546.
42. Riley, 196 F.3d at 518 n.7.
43. JOHN BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QuI TAM ACrIONS 4-7 (1999)
[hereinafter FALSE CLAIMS AND Qui TAM ACTIONS].
44. A person may bring a civil action for a violation under section 3729 on
behalf of him or herself and on behalf of the United States Government. 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(b) (2000).
45. 31 U.S.C § 3730(b)(2) (2000).
46. S. REP. No. 99-345 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5289.
47. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2000).
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continues as a party to the litigation. ' If the Government declines to
intervene, the relator has the right to proceed and conduct the litigation
alone.49 In this scenario, the relator maintains full control over admissions,
discovery and presentation of evidence, with very few limitations." Once
the Government has declined to intervene, it may intervene at a later
point only upon a showing of "good cause."'" However, whether or not the
Government chooses to intervene, the United States must be a named
party to every qui tam case.52
1. Historical Perspective: Qui Tam Provisions in the Original
Act
Congress initially enacted the FCA, also known as the Lincoln Law,53 or
the Informers Act,54 in 1863 to combat defense contractors who were
defrauding the Union Army during the Civil War.5 The bill's sponsor,
Senator Howard, articulated the main purpose of the qui tam provisions:
[t]o hold out to a confederate a strong temptation to betray his
coconspirator, and bring him to justice ... [i]n short, ... I have
based the ... [qui tam provisions of the Bill] upon the old-
fashioned idea of holding out a temptation, and "setting a rogue
to catch a rogue," which is the safest and most expeditious way I
have ever discovered of bringing rogues to justice.56
48. Id. § 3730(c)(1).
49. Id. § 3730(b)(4)(B) (The person bringing the action shall have the right to
conduct the action).
50. Riley, 196 F.3d at 517.
51. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3)(2000) (emphasis added). This later intervention
may not limit "the status and rights of the person initiating the action" and the
relator retains primary control over the case, despite the governments' subsequent
intervention. Id.
52. "A person must bring a civil action for a violation of Section 3729 for the
person and for the United States Government. The action shall be brought in the
name of the Government." 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2000). The government will
only be considered an active party to the litigation if it exercises its right to assume
control of the litigation.
53. Reducing Health Care Fraud, supra note 8, at 26.
54. Health Care Providers and the Public FISC, supra note 36, at 129.
55. See Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 592 (1958). See also
Reducing Health Care Fraud, supra note 8, at 26.
56. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess. 955-56 (1863).
2002]
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The qui tam provisions of the Act were intended to encourage persons
to report information about fraud against the Government.57 As an
incentive, the Act originally provided that a successful relator would be
entitled to one-half of any amount awarded and collected as a result of the
suit, plus costs."
In 1870, not long after the creation of the Act, the Department of
Justice ("DOJ") was established. 9 The DOJ unified and strengthened the
growing government's prosecutorial resources.' Accordingly, "as the
federal government began to expand . . . its regulatory and law-
enforcement mechanisms became firmly established and the need for
private prosecution of the law naturally waned."6 As a result, there were
few reported cases under the qui tam provisions of the FCA during the
first three decades of the twentieth century.62
2. Significant Amendments To The FCA Qui Tam Provisions
Congress has enacted two significant amendments to the FCA qui tam
provisions. The first of these amendments did not occur until 1943, and
the second in 1986. The 1943 amendments were initiated in response to a
plethora of "parasitic" qui tam suits, 63 brought by citizens who merely
copied criminal indictments in hopes of recovering a windfall bounty.' To
57. See Reducing Health Care Fraud, supra note 8, at 27. One of the first cases
considering the qui tam provisions of the FCA was United States v. Griswold. 24 F.
361 (D. Or. 1885), afjd, 30 F. 762 (1887) (reflecting on the qui tam provisions, the
court noted the act was:
passed upon the theory, based on experience as old as modern
civilization, that one of the least expensive and most effective
means of preventing frauds on the Treasury is to make the
perpetrators of them liable to actions by private persons acting,
if you please, under the strong stimulus of personal ill will or the
hope of gain.
Id. at 366.
58. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess. 698, § 6 (1863).
59. Robert E. Johnson, Note: 1001 Attorney's General: Executive-Employee
Qui tam Suits and the Constitution, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 609, 615 (1994)
[hereinafter 1001 Attorney's General].
60. See id.
61. See Riley, 196 F.3d at 546.
62 FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS, supra note 43, at 1-12.
63. Health Care Providers and the Public FISC, supra note 36, at 131.
64. H.R. REP. No. 78-263, at 2 (1943). See also United States v. Baker-
Lockwood Mfg. Co., 138 F.2d 48, 49-50 (8th Cir. 1943), vacated, 321 U.S. 744
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correct this weakness, Congress limited a relator's ability to bring a case
based on information already known to the Government.65 These
amendments also reduced the relator's permissible recovery to twenty-five
percent if the Government did not intervene and ten percent if it did.6
By the late 1980s the Federal Government was firmly involved in
regulating the health care industry. In response to rising concerns over
fraud and abuse in the health care arena,"' Congress made several
dramatic changes to the FCA in 1986.69 Unlike the 1943 amendments,
which were designed to reign in money-hungry relators, the purpose of the
1986 amendments was to encourage private reporting of fraud against the
Government. 0 As a result, the amendments extensively revised and
liberalized the provisions governing qui tam lawsuits.7 ,
Specifically, the 1986 amendments increased the relator's percentage of
recovery in successful FCA prosecutions and guaranteed the relator at
least a set proportion of the recovery.72 In actions where the Government
intervenes, the relator recovers "at least 15 percent but not more than 25
percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim., 73 If the
government does not intervene in the action, the relator's recovery is "not
less than 25 percent and not more than 30 percent of the proceeds of the
action or settlement., 74 The 1986 amendments also significantly increased
(1944)(describing three civil actions under the False Claims Act resulting from an
indictment; one by the Government and two by different relators in different
district courts). One court referred to the practice as the unseemly race to the
courthouse. United States ex rel. Bayarsky v. Brooks, 110 F. Supp. 175, 179-80
(D.N.J. 1953), affd 210 F.2d (3d Cir. 1954).
65. Reducing Health Care Fraud, supra note 8, at 27-28. This decision was
based on the Supreme Court's decision in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317
U.S. 537 (1943) (holding that qui tam suits could be based on information already
known to the government).
66. Reducing Health Care Fraud, supra note 8, at 27.
67. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE
399 (1989).
68. BAUMANN, supra note 14, at 205.
69. Ara Lovett, Note, Fight for Your Right to Litigate: Qui tam, Article II and
the President, 49 STAN. L. REV. 853, 857 (1997) [hereinafter Fight for Your Right].
70. See S. REP. No. 99-345, (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266.
71. See Reducing Health Care Fraud, supra note 8, at 1-23.
72. Id. at 1-24.
73. 31 U.S.C. § 3070(d)(1) (2000).
74. Id. § 3730(d)(2). Interestingly, the relator's recovery will potentially be
more if the government chooses not to intervene. Commenting on the pre-1986
statute, the Senate Report states:
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the penalty for filing false claims from $2,000 per claim to $5,000 - $10,000
per claim.75
The 1986 amendments were intended to revive the Civil War era
statute 6 and thus create a watershed in enforcement and recovery under
the Act." The effect was dramatic."' For example, in 1987 only thirty-three
qui tam cases were filed. 9 In 1988, the number of qui tam cases rose to
sixty.' Nine years later, in 1997, the number increased to five hundred
thirty-three."
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE RELATOR'S ROLE
The FCA's qui tam enforcement provision has existed in some form
since 1863.82 Serious arguments, however, questioning the constitutionality
of the FCA qui tam provisions were not advanced until the 1986
amendments were enacted. 3 Primarily, this is because prior to 1986, qui
tam actions were seldom used and presented few opportunities to
challenge its provisions.Y Since 1986, numerous defendants have argued
that, in empowering private persons to bring suit on behalf of the United
States, the FCA qui tam provisions violate principles fundamental to the
scheme of government established by the United States Constitution.85
If a potential plaintiff reads the present statute and understands that in a
successful case the court may arbitrarily decide to award only a tiny
fraction of the proceeds to the person who brought the action, the
potential plaintiff may decide it is too risky to proceed in the face of a
totally unpredictable recovery.
S. REP. No. 99-345, at 28 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5293.
75. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000). In August 1999, this was increased from $5,500
to $11,000 per claim. See 64 Fed. Reg. 47,099 (Aug. 30, 1999).
76. Health Care Providers and the Public FISC, supra note 36, at 133.
77. Reducing Health Care Fraud, supra note 8, at 1-18.




82. See Rainwater, 356 U.S. at 592-94 (discussing the evolution of the FCA
since 1863).
83. Fight for Your Right, supra note 69, at 859.
84. Id.
85. See generally United States ex. rel. Kelly v. Bowing 9 F.3d 743 (9th Cir.
1993); United States ex rel. Truong v. Northrop Corp., 728 F. Supp. 615 (C.D. Cal.
1989); United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., 722 F.
Supp. 607 (N.D. Cal. 1989); United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int'l Corp. v.
Boeing North Am. Inc., 282 F.3d 787 (10th Cir. 2002); United States ex rel.
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A. Constitutionality of the FCA Qui Tam Provisions Under Article H
Article II challenges levied against qui tam suits generally arise when
the Government chooses not to intervene.86 Authorizing qui tam relators
to enforce a federal law "for the United States Government" '87 raises
serious questions as to whether Congress has granted "executive power in
a self-appointed agent who answers to no one." An analysis of the FCA
qui tam provisions under Article II requires examination of two distinct
clauses: the Take Care Clause89 and the Appointments Clause." Both of
these clauses fall under the umbrella of the Separation of Powers
Doctrine. The constitutionality of the FCA qui tam provisions under
Article II is supported by the following two theories: 1) the benefits to the
government outweigh the drawbacks of diminishing executive power,9 and
2) the government's "right" to intervene and control the litigation.92
These theories, however, fail for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court
has clearly held that the benefit of legislation is not sufficient to pass
constitutional muster alone."3 Therefore, the FCA provisions that
unconstitutionally diminish executive power, based on a benefit to the
government, must be eliminated. Second, arguments that the FCA qui tam
provisions are unconstitutional under Article II typically arise when the
government chooses not to intervene in the litigation.94 The idea that the
LaCorte v. Smithkline Beecham Clinical Lab. Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13036
(E.D. La. 1999); United States ex rel. Sharp v. Consol. Med. Transp. Inc., 2001 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 13923 (N.D. I11. 2001); United States ex rel. Robinson v. Northrop
Corp., 824 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Il1. 1993); United States ex rel. Taxpayers Against
Fraud v. Gen. Electric Co., 41 F.3d 1032 (6th Cir. 1994).
86. See Riley, 196 F.3d at 529 n.43 (noting that the court's decision applies only
to the limited number of cases where the government does not intervene).
87. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1)(2000).
88. United States ex. rel. Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 252 F.3d 749, 760
(5th Cir. 2001)(en banc).
89. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
90. Id.
91. Bales, supra note 4, at 430.
92. Id. at 428. The government's absolute "right" to intervene only occurs at
the initiation of the suit, when the government is given the opportunity to evaluate
the suit. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2000). This "right" is relinquished if the
government elects not to intervene. Any later attempts to intervene in the
"relator's litigation" is subject to the government's ability to show "good cause."
31 U.S.C. § 3730 (c)(3) (2000).
93. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
94. See supra note 87; see also United States ex rel. Rockwell Int'l Corp. v.
Boeing North Am. Inc., 282 F.3d 787, 806 n.6 (2002) (holding the Take Care clause
2002]
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government has a qualified "right" to intervene and elects not to exercise
that right does not mend constitutional violations that result when private
relators exert unchecked executive authority.
Furthermore, recent government statistics on FCA qui tam litigation
support the conclusion that removing the arguably unconstitutional
provisions will not affect the government's ability to root out fraud.95
Indeed, as of September 2001, ninety-five percent of the total recoveries in
all such cases were a result of cases in which the government intervened.'
B. Separation of Powers
Separation of powers distinguishes our Constitutional system from all
other forms of government. 97 "The principle of separation of powers was
not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers."98 The
Framers introduced this fundamental principle because of their belief
"that concentration of power breeds tyranny." 99 Accordingly, they created
the checks and balances implicit in the separation of powers as a "self-
executing safe-guard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one
branch at the expense of the other."' ° When one branch within the
tripartite government impermissibly undercuts or interferes with the
constitutionally authorized powers of another, the doctrine of separation
of powers is violated."'
The fundamental philosophy underlying our governmental structure is
simply stated "[w]hen the legislative and executive powers are united in
the same person or body, . . . there can be no liberty, because
apprehensions may arise lest THE SAME monarch or senate should
ENACT tyrannical laws to EXECUTE them in a tyrannical manner.
' 2
Accordingly, the Framers separated the Executive's responsibilities from
those of the Legislature. Under our tripartite government, "Congress
is not violated when the government chooses to intervene in the FCA litigation but
expressing no opinion as to whether that provision is violated in circumstances
when the government seeks permission to intervene and is denied).
95. See discussion infra at p. 25 - 26.
96. Reducing Health Care Fraud, supra note 8, at 36.
97. See Nixon v. Administrator, 433 U.S. 425, 507 (1977) (Burger, J.,
dissenting).
98. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976)(per curiam).
99. See United States ex. rel. Phillips v. Pediatric Servs. of Am., Inc., 123 F.
Supp. 2d 990, 992 (W.D.N.C. 2000).
100. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 122.
101. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 701 (1997).
102. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (Alexander Hamilton).
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defines legal interests and corresponding obligations based upon its view
of wise social policy, and the executive branch implements those
obligations in specific cases."'' 3
The Supreme Court has described three principal ways in which
unconstitutional congressional "encroachment" or "aggrandizement" on
another branch takes place: 1) by removing a constitutionally authorized
role of another branch," 2) by involving the Legislative branch in
appointing or removing individuals who carry out executive functions,' 5
and 3) by vesting another branch's powers in individuals who, although
chosen without congressional involvement, are still not within the class of
persons authorized under the Constitution to carry out such powers.
'06
Under the principle of separation of powers each branch should remain
free from the control or coercive influence of the other,' 7 however, this
rule is not completely inflexible. The Framers did not design each
separate power "to operate with absolute independence."'" °
Consequently, in deciding whether an act disrupts the appropriate balance
between the three branches, courts should focus on the extent to which the
Executive Branch is prevented from accomplishing its constitutionally
assigned functions.' 6 If a potential disruption exists, it must be justified by
a significant need."0
103. The Constitutionality of Oui tam Actions, supra note 7, at 357.
104. Riley, 196 F.3d at 524. See also Clinton, 520 U.S. at 701 (stating that "the
separation of powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair another in the
performance of its constitutional duties") (quoting Loving v. United States, 517
U.S. 748 (1996); See also INS v. Chadha, 634 U.S. 408, 436 (9th Cir. 1980), affd,
462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding a one-house veto provision eliminates the Executive's
role in clear conflict with the express grant of constitutional authority).
105. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1.
106. See Northern Pipeline Construction Co., 458 U.S. at 87.
107. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935).
108. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
109. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711- 12 (1974).
110. See id.
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III. ARTICLE II PROVISIONS
A. The TAKE CARE CLAUSE: Civil enforcement of Federal Law is
the Quintessential Executive Function
Of the powers that the Constitution delegates to the Executive, none is
more fundamental than the duty to enforce federal laws."' The Take Care
Clause of Article II functions as a critical foundation for the doctrine of
separation of powers."2 The Clause requires the Executive to "take care
that the Laws be faithfully executed."". 3 It further provides the Executive
Branch with the power to enforce these laws."' Embodied in this power is
the authority to "investigate and litigate offenses against the United
States. '
Even before Congress created the FCA, the Take Care Clause has been
at the heart of "one of the oldest debates in American constitutional
law.""116 The Supreme Court has held that a separation of powers violation
may occur when an act fails to provide the Executive branch "sufficient
control""' over the act's enforcement powers, thereby failing "to ensure
that the President is able to perform his constitutionally assigned duties."
8
The provisions of the FCA that limit the Executive's ability to commence
litigation, after previously declining to intervene, lacks the "sufficient
control" contemplated by the Supreme Court. This is because the FCA qui
tam provisions lack the keystone Executive involvement necessary in
making the initial decision to prosecute. " 9
111. See, e.g., Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926).
112 Riley, 252 F.3d at 760.
113. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
114. See Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189,202 (1928).
115. Stiliwell v. Hughes, 714 F. Supp. 1084, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 1989)(citing
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 138).
116. Bales, supra note 4, at 410.
117. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988).
118. Id.
119. The majority opinion in Riley attempts to differentiate between the
Executive duty to enforce criminal versus civil statutes such as the FCA. 252 F.3d
at 752. The Supreme Court's holding in Buckley specifically looks at the
importance of the Executive's ability to enforce civil statutes, thus there arguably
is no difference in the Executives duties under Article II. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at
140 - 141 (holding that the provisions of the Act that vest civil enforcement powers
with the Commission violates Article It).
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Allowing qui tam relators to initiate lititation conflicts with the Framers'
intent to vest the President with the duty of enforcing the law. Similar to
the intentions behind the creation of the DOJ,2 ° the office of the Attorney
General was created to centralize law enforcement in the Executive
Branch.' 2' Thus, the Attorney General acts to advance the President's
faithful execution of the laws.'22 Under this arrangement, the President
oversees prosecutorial authority in a unified manner.
23
In contrast, by enacting the FCA, Congress has not only invoked its
own power to create legislation, but has also usurped the President's
power to control enforcement of those laws.2 2 Accordingly, when the
government does not intervene, the FCA's private civil prosecution
120. The Department of Justice was created to assist the Executive with the
"legal business of the United States." Department of Justice Selected Bibliography
(Jan. 2001) at http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/ls/dojbib2000.htm.
121. United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 706 (1988)
Among the reasons for reserving [authority] ... to the Attorney General.
• . is the concern that the United States usually should speak with one
voice . . . and with a voice that reflects not the parochial interests of a
particular agency, but the common interests of the Government and
therefore all the people.
122. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965).
123. See Bruce Ledewitz, The Uncertain Power of the President to Execute the
Laws, 47 TENN. L. REV. 757, 770-71 (1979). Initially, the Department of Justice
was not prepared to defend the constitutionality of the FCA qui tam provisions.
See 139 CONG. REC. S. 4398 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1993)(statement of Sen. Mitchell).
Indeed, it was the Senate that vigorously defended the law. See id. See also 139
CONG. REC. S 875 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1993) (Statement of Sen. Grassley):
Hopefully, whoever President Clinton sends up here as the next nominee
for Attorney General will be able to openly support qui tam. The
executive branch should help guarantee that we will be able to use it in
the future, and make sure that everything connected with it is carried out
and fully used. I think even in the bowels of the bureaucracy of the
Justice Department ... there are people who do not like this because, as a
practical matter, every time an individual citizen [brings a suit] it is a clear
signal that the Justice Department is not doing its job.
Senator Grassley does not explain, however, why he believes it is constitutional for
a private citizen, who has not been assigned any private rights, to do the Justice
Department's job. Mr. Grassley's statements seem to take the position that the
FCA qui tam provisions should be upheld as constitutional because he wants them
to be. See also infra note 200.
124. Riley, 252 F.3d at 761.
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authority encroaches on the Executive's authority to initiate and control
litigation brought to protect the government's interests.'"
B. Historical Precedent: The Ninth Circuit's Analysis Begins a Bad
Habit
When analyzing Article II Take Care issues raised under the qui tam
provisions of the FCA, most courts follow the Ninth Circuit's precedent,
established in United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co.126 Although it was
one of the first circuit cases to address the issue, Kelly remains the most
acclaimed opinion in continuing to sustain the FCA's qui tam provisions
under Article II separation of powers challenges.' Despite its wide
following, the reasoning presented in Kelly is inherently flawed.
1. Facts of Kelly
Kelly put forward classic dual Article II constitutional arguments over
executive involvement in the initiation of the FCA litigation under the
Take Care Clause and the ability to appoint or remove a relator under the
Appointments clause. In Kelly, a former Boeing employee filed a qui tam
complaint. The plaintiff alleged that Boeing submitted improper facility
lease costs to the government while working on the government's
Advanced Tactical Fighter programs." After completing its investigation,
125. Riley, 196 F.3d at 525-26.
126. United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 751-52 (9th Cir. 1993).
127. Robin K. Craig, Will Separation of Powers Challenges "Take Care" of
Environmental Citizen Suits? Article I1, Injury-in-Fact, Private "Enforcers," and
Lessons From Qui tam Litigation, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 93, 147-48 (2001). See, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 20 F. Supp.
2d 1017 (S.D. Tex. 1998); United States ex rel. Roby v. Boeing Co., 995 F. Supp.
790 (S.D. Ohio 1998); United States ex rel. Chandler v. Hektoen Inst. for Med.
Research, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (N.D. Ill. 1999); United States ex rel. Fallon v.
Accudyne Corp., 921 F. Supp. 611 (W.D. Wis. 1995); United States ex rel. Stone v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 265 F.3d 1157 (10th Cir. 2001); United States ex rel. Wright v.
Cleo Wallace Ctrs., 132 F. Supp. 2d 913 (D. Colo. 2000); United States ex rel. Riley
v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 252 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Phillips v.
Pediatric Servs. of Am., Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 990 (W.D.N.C. 2000). Prior to the
Ninth Circuit's decision, several district courts held the qui tam provisions of the
FCA to be constitutional in the face of similar Article II challenges. See, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Truong v. Northrop Corporation, 728 F. Supp. 615 (C.D. Cal.
1989); United States ex rel. Newshamn v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Co. Inc.,
722 F. Supp. 607 (N.D. Cal.1989).
12& Kelly, 9 F.3d at 745.
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the government declined to intervene in the case." 9 Pursuant to the Act,
Kelly elected to proceed with the action on his own. 3° After being served
with Kelly's complaint, Boeing moved to dismiss the action based on the
following four constitutional violations: (1) Article III's standing doctrine;
(2) Article II's Appointments Clause; (3) the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause; and (4) the principle of separation of powers.13
Boeing asserted that the qui tam provisions allowing a relator to
proceed with an action where the government elects not to intervene
violate the Executive's authority under Article II by giving the relator
primary authority to conduct the action." 2 The Western District of
Washington upheld the qui tam provisions, but certified an interlocutory
appeal of its rulings on the constitutional challenges.3 3 The Ninth Circuit
granted Boeing's petition for appeal."'
2. Ninth Circuit Analysis
In addressing whether the FCA qui tam provisions violate separation of
powers principles, the Ninth Circuit was faced with a unique question.
The Ninth Circuit had to ascertain "the degree to which Congress may
assign prosecutorial powers to persons not under the direct control of the
Executive Branch.', 5 Prior to Kelly, the Supreme Court addressed
separation of powers problems raised when one branch of government
encroaches on the power of another. 36 The Supreme Court, however,
"never considered a situation [like the FCA] where Congress has sought
to disperse some quantum of executive authority amongst the general
public.' 37 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit determined that the appropriate
issue was whether the FCA qui tam provisions "disrupt[] the proper
balance between the coordinate branches [by] prevent[ing] the Executive
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 745.
132. Id. at 747.
133. Id. at 745.
134. Kelly, 9 F.3d . at 747.
135. Id. at 751. Congress assigned prosecutorial discretion to private citizens
under "citizen suits." These statutes are fundamentally different than the FCA
because each of these statutes contains an unqualified right for the government to
intervene in the litigation.
136. Kelly, 9 F.3d at 750 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382
(1989)).
137. Id. at 750.
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Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions."'38 In
light of this, the court looked to the most analogous Supreme Court
authority in Morrison v. Olson.39 Morrison provided a comprehensive
baseline to assess the degree of prosecutorial powers that Congress may
assign to persons not under direct executive branch control.'40
3. Morrison Precedent
In Morrison, the Supreme Court addressed constitutional issues created
by the Ethics in Government Act ("EGA") of 1978.' 4' The EGA
authorized the Attorney General to appoint an independent counsel to
investigate and prosecute high-level government officials for federal
criminal offenses.'42 The purpose of the Act was to ensure that executive
officials were held accountable when they break the law.
143
One of the primary issues in Morrison involved the provision of the Act
that allowed the removal of the independent counsel only for "good
cause." '44 The "good cause" removal power presented a constitutional
concern because "the functions performed by the independent counsel
[were] executive.' '4 5 These functions consisted of "full power and
independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial
functions and powers of the Department of Justice.', 146 In considering
13& Id. at 750-51 (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988)).
139. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
140. Kelly, 9 F.3d at 751.
141. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (2000).
142. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660 (under 28 U.S.C. § 591(a) the statute applies to
violations of "any Federal criminal law other than a violation classified as a Class
B or C misdemeanor or an infraction.").
143. Act of Dec. 2, 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-191, 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. (101 Stat.
1293) 2150-2151 (noting the act was created "to establish a new process for
investigating and prosecuting top officials suspected of criminal conduct" in
response to Watergate's 'Saturday Night Massacre.').
144. 28 U.S.C. § 595(a)(1) (2000) provides:
[A]n independent counsel appointed under this chapter may be removed
from office, other than by impeachment and conviction, only by the
personal action of the Attorney General and only for good cause, physical
disability, mental incapacity, or any other condition that substantially
impairs the performance of such independent counsel's duties.
145. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691. See discussion infra at p. 18. (This issue only
arises after the Attorney General makes the decision to appoint an independent
counsel).
146. Id. at 662. The functions of the independent counsel "include initiating and
conducting prosecutions in any court of competent jurisdiction, framing and
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whether these features were invalid under the principle of separation of
powers, the Court addressed two related issues: First, whether the "good
cause" removal provision, taken by itself, impermissibly interferes with the
President's constitutionally assigned functions 47 and second, whether the
Act, as a whole, reduced the President's ability to control the independent
counsel's prosecutorial powers.'4 8
In examining the EGA's "good cause"'49 removal provision the Court
held that the President's power to oversee and control the independent
counsel was not impermissibly burdened because the President, not
congress, retained removal power.'m Next, in addressing the Act as a
whole, the Court outlined four factors that allowed the Attorney General
to supervise or control the independent counsel's prosecutorial powers. 5 '
The two most important considerations were 1) the fact that an
Independent Counsel could not be appointed "without a specific request
by the Attorney General,"'5 2 a decision that was "committed to his
unreviewable discretion," ,' and 2) the Attorney General's "good cause"
removal power. Under these provisions, the executive retained sufficient
signing indictments, filing informations, and handling all aspects of any case, in the
name of the United States." Additional functions included conducting grand jury
proceedings and other investigations, participating in civil and criminal court
proceedings and litigation, and appealing any decision in any case in which the
counsel participates in an official capacity. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(1)-(3) (2000).
147. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 685.
14& Id.
149. The Court did not define "good cause" but noted that based on the
legislative history, "misconduct" was enough for removal. Id. at 692.
150. Id. at 693. In making this decision the court looked to previous decisions
where a statute authorized an executive official to be removed only by congress.
See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 487 U.S. 714, 730 (1986), Meyers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52 (1972). It also looked to decisions that restricted the President's power to
remove officials. See, e.g., Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 252 U.S. 602
(1935); Weiner v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
151. Morisson, 487 U.S. at 695-96. The court noted that these factors were
sufficient in light of the circumstances for which the act was created. "It is
undeniable that the Act reduces the amount of control or supervision that . . . the
President exercises over the investigation and prosecution of a certain class of
alleged criminal activity." Id. at 696.
152. Id. The Attorney General did not get to appoint the individual of his
choice however, the Attorney General was the only executive officer entitled to
make the decision to appoint an independent prosecutor. Id. (emphasis added).
153. Id.
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control over the power to initiate and supervise the independent counsel
investigation.'
The remaining two factors were: 1) the jurisdiction of the independent
counsel was based on the facts submitted by the Attorney General, and 2)
the requirement that, once appointed, the independent counsel must abide
by Justice Department policy unless it is not "possible" to do so.' In sum,
the Court found all four features sufficient to ensure that the President is
capable of performing his constitutionally assigned duties.
The result of the Morrison decision was essentially the establishment of
a balancing test. Because of the unique circumstances presented 57 the
Court carefully weighed the interest of maintaining an accountable
executive branch against the need for the statute.'58 Based on Morrison,
Congress may limit the inherent Presidential control over prosecutions
only in cases where there is an overriding need that merits reducing
executive accountability.'59
4. Kelly's Application of Morrison
Applying the Morrison analysis to the FCA, the Kelly court faced a
significant question: did the Supreme Court intend to articulate a test that
must be applied point by point"6 to acts that potentially undermine the
Executive's function? Alternatively, did Morrison create a balancing test,
which looks to the act as a whole in assessing its level of encroachment on
the Executive Branch? 61 In Kelly, the defendant, Boeing, argued that
Morrison represented the outer limits of restricting executive duties.'62
Boeing urged the court to look at the means of control deemed sufficient
in Morrison and to formulate a decision based on the presence or absence
of those means in the FCA qui tam provisions.6 1 Conversely, Kelly argued
that the court should identify all possible means of executive control in
154. Id. (emphasis added).
155. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696.
156. Id.
157. If Morrison had not allowed these provisions, the President would
essentially be investigating himself.
15& See id. at 695-96.
159. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 386.
160. Kelly, 9 F.3d at 751-52.
161. Id.
162 Id.
163. Id. at 752.
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the FCA qui tam provisions and compare them as a whole to the means of
control identified in Morrison.64
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit determined Kelly's approach was correct
because "[tiwice in Morrison, the Court stated that the proper inquiry is
whether the Act 'taken as a whole' violates the principle of separation of
powers."' 65 The court concluded that "[tiaken as a whole . . . the FCA
affords the Executive Branch a degree of control over qui tam relators that
is not distinguishable from the degree of control the Morrison court found
the Executive Branch exercises over independent counsels."
'66
In support of its decision, the court relied on two specific aspects of the
FCA. First, under the FCA, the government can elect to intervene and
take the lead in prosecuting the action.'67 Second, in the situation where
the government does not intervene, it can move to dismiss a case that it
believes has no merit but, only after the relator is notified and provided an
opportunity for a hearing."
5. Qui Tam Power has a Pernicious Impact on the President's
Duty to Faithfully Execute the Law
Examining the FCA as a whole, the Kelly court concluded that even
with the Executive Branch's qualified power to end qui tam litigation it
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Kelly, 9 F. 3d at 757.
167. Id. at 753.
168 Id. It is important to understand that the government may or may not win
on this issue. If the government looses its motion to dismiss, the relator is still
entitled to proceed in the name of the government, without any sufficient
government involvement or control. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (b)(4)(B) & (c)(3) (2000).
The Kelly court recognized this distinction in a footnote, stating that "[Ilt is not
clear whether in practice this notice and hearing requirement has amounted to
much of a hurdle for the government." Kelly, 9 F.3d at 754, n.11. Remarkably, the
court admitted that the Government has greater authority to prevent the initiation
of prosecution by an independent counsel than by a qui tam relator. However,
instead of thoroughly analyzing the issue, the court, without much analysis simply
went on to conclude:
[O]nce prosecution has been initiated, the government has greater
authority to limit the conduct of the prosecutor and ultimately end the
litigation in a qui tam action than it does in an independent counsel's
action. We conclude that because the Executive Branch has power, albeit
somewhat qualified, to end qui tam litigation, it is not significant that it
cannot prevent its start.
9 F.3d at 754.
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was "not significant that it can not prevent [the litigation's] start."69 The
Ninth Circuit was correct in noting that Morrison examined the EGA as a
whole, however, Kelly's comparison of the FCA as a whole is flawed
because it missed an integral part of the Morrison analysis.
In Morrison, the Supreme Court essentially took a two-step approach to
address the separation of powers issues raised by the EGA. First, the
court examined the provision of the Act that presented the closest
constitutional question in isolation; whether the "good cause" removal
provisions of the act "taken by itself impermissibly interfered with the
President's exercise of his constitutionally appointed functions.""17 Second,
the Court looked to how the act as a whole reduced the President's ability
to manage the prosecutorial powers held by the independent counsel. 7'
The Morrison court did not explicitly say that completing both steps
was a bright line rule.' In focusing on the FCA as a whole, however, the
Kelly court underestimated constitutional implications that arise under the
provisions of the FCA that require the government to show "good cause"
to intervene in litigation once it has initially declined. ' When examined
in isolation, the FCA qui tam provisions that prevent the executive branch
from entering litigation it has initially declined to pursue (except upon a
showing of good cause) are beyond the type of intrusion contemplated by
Morrison.74
169. Kelly, 9 F.3d at 754.
170. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 685.
171. Id.
172. See id.
173. Id (noting "[t]wo related issues must be addressed: The first is whether the
provision of the Act restricting the Attorney General's power to remove the
independent counsel to only those instances in which he can show 'good cause,'
taken by itself, impermissibly interferes with the President's exercise of his
constitutionally appointed functions. The second is whether, taken as a whole, the
Act violates the separation of powers by reducing the President's ability to control
the prosecutorial powers wielded by the independent counsel.").
174. There is a fundamental difference in the executive control authorized in
the EGA and the executive control authorized in the FCA. Under the EGA, no
action takes place until after the Attorney General investigates the matter and
determines there is "reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation or
prosecution is warranted." Morrison, 487 U.S. at 661. In Morrison, the Supreme
Court found executive powers remained intact because an independent counsel
may only be appointed upon the Attorney General's request and are "specifically
prevented from reviewing the Attorney General's decision not to seek
appointment. Id. at 695 (citing § 592(f) of the Act). Conversely, under the FCA
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C. Kelly's Analysis Critiqued
If the Ninth Circuit followed a true Morrison analysis, it first should
have looked solely to the FCA provisions that raise the most serious
threat of intrusion into matters more properly within Executive authority.
Then the court should have looked to the Act as a whole. Unlike the
EGA, the FCA provisions that present the most serious threat to the
Executive branch are not the provisions that allow the government to limit
the realtors role, which occurs when the government has taken primary
responsibility for the litigation.' Rather, it is the FCA qui tam provisions
that allow the relator to proceed in the name of the government, even
when the government has declined to intervene. Moreover, the
government's authority is further limited by the provisions that allow a
court to determine whether the Executive will be able to intervene at a
later date if it wishes. 6
1. Private Enforcement Qui Tam Relators are Enforcing a
Federal Law
The President, as Chief Executive Officer, is constitutionally charged
with executing federal law.'77 The Supreme Court has made clear that a
major element of the Executive's exercise of prosecutorial discretion is
determining whether and how to proceed in the enforcement of federal
law.7 The FCA qui tam provisions specifically authorize private relators
to make prosecutorial decisions to initiate and enforce federal law,
unaided by the Attorney General. 79 These provisions conclusively curtail
the action may still move forward even if the government declines to intervene.
See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (c)(3) (2000).
175. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (2000).
176. Id.
177. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
178. See Nixon v. United States, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (stating "the
Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide
whether to prosecute a case."). See also Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249
- 250 (1980) ("[a] scheme injecting a personal interest, financial or otherwise, into
the enforcement process may bring irrelevant or impermissible factors into the
prosecutorial decision..."). Although these statements are essentially dicta, it is
not inappropriate for a court to give great weight to Supreme Court dicta. See
United States v. Caro, 260 F.3d 1209, 1210 (10th Cir. 2001). The Attorney General
has also been found to have non-reviewable discretion to initiate a lawsuit in
United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171-72 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 381 U.S. 935
(1965).
179. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2000).
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the Attorney General's powers, raising valid questions as to the degree of
encroachment on the Executive's authority to initiate lawsuits.
Some courts have argued that the FCA qui tam provisions authorizing
private enforcement are no different than "citizen suits,"''8' which have
been held constitutional. These statutes allow a similar intrusion on the
executive function of initiating prosecution.'2 Careful examination of the
citizen suit provisions, prove these arguments are less than convincing.
There are three fundamental differences between citizen suit statutes
and the FCA. First, the "citizen suit" statutes provide the government
with an unqualified right to intervene once a private citizen has
commenced litigation. '83 Second, these statutes allow citizens to sue on
their "own behalf." Thus, they have been assigned a private right, whereas
the FCA only allows relators to sue "in the name of the government. '
FCA relators are not suing to redress a private injury.' 8 They are
essentially acting as the government's agents." Suing in the name of the
180. "The vesting of the executive power in the President was essentially a grant
of the power to execute the laws." Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926).
181. Citizen suits are also civil actions brought by private parties for violation of
federal statutes. Examples of these types of suits include the Water Pollution
Prevention and Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2000), The Toxic Substance
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a) (2000), The Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §
1540(a) (2000), and The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C § 7401-7671 (2000). Similar
Article II Take Care and Appointments Clause arguments have been made
regarding Citizen suits. For a comprehensive analysis of the Article II issues
presented with citizen suits, see generally Craig, supra note 127.
182. These statutes authorize citizens to commence an action on their own
behalf. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2000), 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a) (2000), 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(2)(g) (2000).
183. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2)(B) (2000), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2) (2000), 15 U.S.C.
§ 2619 (2000). The FCA requires the government show "good cause" to intervene
at a later date. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (2000).
184. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (2000).
185. See United States ex rel. Milam v. The Univ. of Texas M.D. Anderson
Cancer Ctr., 961 F.2d 46, 49 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting "[a] qui tam relator is
essentially a self-appointed attorney general, and his recovery is analogous to a
lawyer's contingent fee."). See also 139 CONG. REC. S 875 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1993)
(statement of Sen. Grassley) (stating that the FCA qui tam provisions "deputize
private citizens to act as prosecutors."). See also Vermont Agency of Nat.
Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773-74 (2000) (resting its
Article III standing decision on an assignment theory because there the relator is
redressing a government injury only).
186. United States ex rel. Purcess v. MWI Corp., 209 F.R.D. 21, 26 (D.D.C.
2002) ("[b]y allowing the relator to bring the action 'in the name of the
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government is equivalent to enforcing a public right, and enforcing a
public right is considered a core executive function.' 7 Third, individuals
enforcing citizen suits have no incentive to bring the suit other than to
protect the health and welfare of similarly situated persons. 8 Unlike the
FCA's "bounty' ' 89 provisions, citizen suits do not explicitly provide
damages to be awarded to the individual. Since the FCA does not contain
the same type of safeguards to government involvement as citizen suits
provide, the comparison is inappropriate.
2. Judicial Encroachment: Courts May Not Constrain Executive
Involvement in Litigation Under any Circumstances.
Perhaps the greatest threat to the Executive Branch's ability to exercise
its constitutional functions under Article II arises under the provision that
vests the judicial branch with the power to choose whether the executive
will participate in federal litigation. Under the FCA, if the government
initially elects not to intervene in the litigation, it must show the court
"good cause" if it later wishes to be involved.8 It is this "good cause"
requirement that further usurps traditional Executive prosecutorial
discretion.
The Supreme Court has stated that "executive or administrative duties
of a non-judicial nature may not be imposed on judges holding office
under Article III of the Constitution. '"' 9' Article III limits judicial power to
the resolution of cases and controversies.'9 Based on both Supreme Court
precedent and the doctrine of separation of powers, it is not appropriate
for judges to trespass on the Executive's constitutional duty to "take care
that the laws be faithfully executed." This exercise of judgment and
Government' and by allowing the relator to receive a percentage of the proceeds
that the government recovers, the legislature left no doubt that the relator is acting
on behalf of the government.") (citation omitted).
187. Craig, supra note 127, at 160. See also United States ex rel. Truong v.
Northrop Corp., 728 F. Supp. 615, 621 n.9 (D. Cal. 1989) ("[t]he relator's authority
to sue in the name of the government distinguishes the False Claims Act from
most private attorneys general statutes where citizen plaintiffs must commence
suits on their own behalf.").
188. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Assoc., 453 U.S.
1, 18 n. 27 (1981).
189. See United States ex rel. Stevens v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources,
529 U.S. at 773-774 (discussing relators bounty).
190. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (c)(3) (2000).
191. Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, 123 (1976)(citing United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40
(1852)).
192. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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discretion is inherent in the Executive branch.193 Moreover, the decision to
allow Executive participation in litigation does not amount to a decision
regarding a case or controversy.
Thus, the FCA's grant of authority to the judiciary raises difficult and
fundamental separation of powers questions. Indeed, at the time of its
ruling, the Kelly court noted that it was unclear whether the "good cause"
requirement interferes with the government's prosecutorial authority
when the government declines to intervene.1 94 However, in July 2000, in
United States ex rel. Fender v. Tenet Healthcare Corp.,95 the Northern
District of Alabama held that a relator could dismiss or settle an action
without the Attorney General's consent when the Government did not
initially intervene. This decision is in clear contravention of the FCA's
plain language,'" which states that a realtor may only settle or dismiss a
case with the written consent of the Attorney General.'9 Such disregard
further supports the tenet that the Executive's authority is usurped
because the judiciary made a decision that falls squarely within the
Executive Branch's authority.
Based on a tighter analysis of the rationale in Morrison, the Ninth
Circuit's failure to adequately address the separation of powers issues
raised by the FCA's significant displacement of executive authority is
inappropriate. This is particularly true because most of the "control"
provisions touted as balancing the FCA as a whole are only available
193. See Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928) (noting it is the
Executive's discretionary ability to seek judicial relief is squarely a constitutional
authority).
194. Kelly, 9 F.3d at 756 (9th Cir. 1993).
195. 105 F. Supp. 2d 1228,1231 (N.D. Al. 2000) (stating "[t]he Justice
Department has no right to nullify a settlement agreement in a case in which it is
not a party."). There is some disagreement among the circuts on this issue.
Compare United States ex rel. Pratt v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d
942, 947-951 (C.D. Cal.) (approving a settlement agreement despite the
government's objections) with United States ex rel. doyle v. Health Possibilities,
P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335, 339-340(6th Cir. 2000)(refusing to allow the relator to settle
the case without the Attorney General's consent even though the government did
not intervene).
196. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)(stating that if the
statute provides a clear answer, "the sole function of the courts is to enforce it
according to its terms.").
197. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2000)(emphsis added).
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when the government intervenes and has taken primary control over the
litigation.'9
Furthermore, unlike the circumstances in Morrison, congressional
interest in FCA qui tam procedures does not justify the extreme intrusion
into the Executive Branch allowed by the statute.' 99  Indeed, as of
September 2000, an overwhelming ninety-five percent of total recoveries
received by the government under the FCA qui tam provisions have come
directly from cases where the government has intervened '"
19& See Kelly, 9 F.3d at 753-54. Specifically, the court mentions that the
government can seek to limit the relator's participation, which occurs when the
government has elected to intervene. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (c)(C)-(D) (2000). The
statute does not provide the government with the same ability to limit the relator's
participation if it does not intervene. It only allows the government to potentially
intervene at a later date if it is able to show the court "good cause." 31 U.S.C. §
3730 (c)(3) (2000).
If the Government elects not to proceed with the action, the
person who initiated the action shall have the right to conduct
the action .... When a person proceeds with the action, the
court, without limiting the status and rights of the person
initiating the action, may nevertheless permit the Government
to intervene at a later date upon a showing of good cause.
Id.
199. Nonetheless, it appears that there is great pressure from Congress to
maintain the constitutionality of the qui tam provisions of the FCA, regardless of
the merit arguments against it. In January 2001, during the Senate Judiciary
hearings for John Ashcroft's nomination for attorney general, Senator Grassley
raised the topic of the current debate over the constitutionality of the FCA.
Nomination for Attorney General, Hearing of the S. Judiciary Comm., Jan. 17,
2001. During this Hearing, Senator Grassley alerted Mr. Ashcroft to the issues and
stated, "I'm concerned that the key people that you will include on your team...
have a positive attitude towards the False Claims Act." Senator Grassley noted
that he has asked all previous nominees if they would defend the constitutionality
of the Act and noted that he felt his message got through. Id.
Following this statement, the Senator specifically asked that if the constitutionality
of the Act were raised that Mr. Ashcroft "simply see that your people don't do any
destructive action to what is already constitutional." Mr. Ashcroft agreed. Senator
Grassley's questioning of Mr. Ashcroft and his clear and strong suggestion of what
the executive branch, under Mr. Ashcroft should do, is a classic illustration of the
type of encroachment feared by the Framers. If Congress is placing such pressures
on the executive branch, surely those pressures also flow to the judiciary. In light
of these pressures, there is undeniable pressure on two branches of government to
maintain the status quo.
200. Taxpayers Against Fraud, Qui Tam Statistics (Sept. 20, 2000) available at
http://www.taf.org/statistics.html.
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Some courts have argued that invalidating the FCA qui tam provisions
will hurt the federal treasury."' Realistically, these concerns are not
significant. Thirteen years of recovery statistics demonstrate that the FCA
qui tam provisions that seriously encroach on executive law enforcement
duties only affect the five percent of cases where the government does not
intervene.2 02 There can be no dispute that invalidating these provisions
poses no threat to the effectiveness of the statute. The purpose of enacting
the FCA was to aid the government by encouraging citizens to report
fraud.2°3 Recovery statistics support the fact that this purpose is not
furthered by the FCA's unconstitutional provisions.
The constitutional flaw in authorizing the judiciary to take part in
traditional Executive decisions is not simply a technical oversight. It
clearly contravenes the Constitution's vesting of Executive power. This
power effectively voids the constitutional protections of the Executive
power envisioned by the Framers. In Kelly, the Ninth Circuit
inappropriately focused its attention on the Executive's control over
relators in situations where the government intervenes, rather than the
greater issue of the Judiciary's ability to completely block out the
Executive Branch when the government initially elects not to intervene in
the litigation.
3. The Appointments Clause: Qui Tam Relators Given
Authority to Prosecute a Federal Act are Neither Appointed,
Nor Officers.
In conjunction with their intent to establish an independent Executive
Branch, the Framers realized the power and duty to faithfully administer
the laws could only be accomplished by vesting the Executive with the
right to choose subordinate officers to carry out that responsibility.2 " In
this manner, the Framers envisioned that the President would be less
201. Riley, 196, F.3d at 514, (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Smith, J. dissenting).
202. TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD, FALSE CLAIMS ACr AND Qui TAM
QUARTERLY REVIEW, Vol. 27, at 40 (July 2002), available at www.taf.org/
publications/pdf/uly02qr.pdf. As of September 20, 2001 the total recoveries in all
Qui Tam cases the United States declined to intervene (1988 - 2001) represented
five percent (5%) of total recoveries. Id.
203. See discussion supra at p.7.
204. See U.S. CONsT. art. I1, § 2, cl. 2 ("the president is charged to take care that
the laws be faithfully executed. "). See also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 135-36 (noting
with respect to Article II, a "reasonable implication, even in the absence of express
words, was that as a part of his executive power he should select those who were to
act for him under his direction in the execution of those laws").
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susceptible to interest-group pressure and favoritism than a collective
body such as Congress. 5 Furthermore, authorizing the President with the
power to select officers of the United States under the Appointments
Clause prevents congressional intrusion on the Executive and Judicial
Branches.2°
Many separation of powers arguments surrounding the Take Care
Clause also involve appointment issues such as the appointment or
removal of federal officials2" or, as in the case of FCA qui tam litigation,
non-appointment of persons enforcing federal laws. Appointments clause
issues generally arise in conjunction with Take Care Clause issues because
this clause sets forth the exclusive procedure for selecting and authorizing
those persons who may execute the laws on behalf of the United States.2°s
In addition to the power to appoint 2°9 under Article II, the President
also has the power to remove Officers from their positions except where
Congress avails itself of impeachment remedies. 2'0  These Article II
constraints serve an important purpose. As the Supreme Court noted in
Meyers v. United States," the President may need to "supervise and guide"
those who execute the laws "in order to secure that unitary and uniform
execution of the laws which Article II of the constitution evidently
contemplated in vesting the general executive power in the President
alone."2 '2 Resolution of separation of powers questions raised under the
Appointments clause must look at the extent to which Congress has
205. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997).
206. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 128 - 131.
207. Craig, supra note 127, at 131.
208. "Congress' power ... is inevitably bounded by the express language of
Article II, cl. 2, and unless the method it provides comports with the latter, the
holders of those offices will not be 'Officers of the United States."' Buckley, 424
U.S. at 138-39 (discussing Congress' power under the Necessary and Proper
Clause).
209. The Appointments Clause provides:
the President shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided
for, and which shall be established by Law. But the Congress may by Law
vest the appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
U.S. CONST. art § 2, cl 2.
210. See Bowsher v. Syner, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986).
211. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
212. Meyers, 272 U.S. at 135.
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thwarted the Executive Branch's constitutional law enforcement role by
supplanting the power to 'appoint' persons who can appropriately
'enforce' federal law.
D. Appointments Clause and Qui tam Relators
The Appointments Clause creates two kinds of officers: principal
officers, who must be appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate, and inferior officers, who can be appointed by the President alone,
by a Court of Law or by the Head of a Department."3 The Appointments
Clause raises two potential issues when applied to a qui tam relator: first,
whether the person is an officer of the United States, and if he is, what
kind of officer?"' If the relator meets the definition of an officer of the
United States, either principal or inferior, then the Appointments Clause
must be followed.
Under the FCA, relators undertake statutory responsibilities by
exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States. "
They exercise the full authority of a department head, but unlike an
independent counsel or special prosecutors, they have not been appointed
under Article 11.216 Further they are not employees of the federal
government. 7 Therefore, the key question is whether qui tam relators
qualify as officers or, if they are not officers based on the powers
authorized to them, whether they should be classified as such.
E. Appointments Clause: Supreme Court Guidance
Under the Appointments Clause, the term "Officer" is not defined, nor
is any guidance provided to distinguish between a principal and inferior
officer.1 8 The Supreme Court, however, has addressed this issue in two
cases: Buckley v. Valeo"9 and Morrison v. Olson.220 In Buckley, the
Supreme Court examined whether Congressionally appointed members of
the Federal Election Commission were officers of the United States for
213. U.S. CONST. art. II, cl. 2.
214. Craig, supra note 127, at 31-32.
215. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(3)(B) & (c)(3) (2000).
216. Id.
217. See Riley, 252 F.3d at 758 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (noting that qui tam
plaintiffs are not government employees and do not draw a government salary).
21& See Edmonds, 520 U.S. at 661.
219. 424 U.S. 1 (1976)(per curiam).
220. 487 U.S. 654 (1988)(holding that an independent prosecutor under the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978 was an inferior officer).
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tlhe purposes of the Appointments Clause. The Supreme Court struck
d6wn the provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 197121
because the Act vested primary responsibility for conducting civil
litigation to vindicate public rights in violation of Article II, section two,
clause two of the Constitution. In Buckley, the Court held that "[s]uch
functions may be discharged only by persons who are 'Officers of the
United States' within the language of that section.,
222
The Buckley court viewed the Appointments Clause as a device to keep
Congress from usurping more than its constitutionally permissible share of
government authority.2 3 In analyzing the meaning of the term "officer,"
the Court was clear:
"Officers of the United States"... is a term intended to have
substantive meaning. We think its fair import is that any
appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of
the United States is an "Officer of the United States," and must,
therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed by §2, cl. 2 of
[Article 11] .224
This conclusion is buttressed by previous Supreme Court decisions in
which the Court has said: "[n]ot having the power of appointment, unless
expressly granted or incidental to its powers, the legislature cannot engraft
executive duties upon a [private person], since that would usurp the power
of appointment by indirection."2'
Similarly, in Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court articulated the
difference between inferior and principal officers.2 6  In Morrison, the
Court relied on several factors to make this distinction regarding the
EGA's independent counsel provisions. 21' First, the independent counsel
was subject to removal by the Attorney General. Second, the
independent counsel performed limited duties under a limited tenure. 12
221. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 144.
222. Id. at 140. See also Riley, 252 F.3d at 755 (5th Cir. 2001) (attempting to
distinguish the enforcement authority of private relators under the FCA based on
the fact that they are "simply civil litigants."). In light of Buckley's thorough
discussion of enforcement of a civil statute, this distinction must fail.
223. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 138-39.
224. Id. at 125-26 (emphasis added).
225. Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189,202 (1928).
226. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 671-72.
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Some years later, in Edmond v. United States,"° the Supreme Court
clarified both Buckley and Morrison. With respect to Buckley, the Court
determined that the "exercise of significant authority pursuant to the laws
of the United States" denotes the line between officer and non-officer
rather than principal and inferior officer for Appointment Clause
purposes."2 The Court continued to clarify its distinction in Morrison by
noting that the difference between principal and inferior officers was
marked by supervision by someone who was appointed by Presidential
nomination. 2 The resulting test as to whether someone is an officer is
two-fold. Under Buckley, an officer of the United States exercises
significant authority, and under Morrison, principal and inferior officers
have a hierarchical relationship.
F. Critique of the Kelly Analysis of the Appointments Clause
The Ninth Circuit's analysis of the Take Care Clause in Kelly v. Boeing
Co. 3 decisively colored its Appointments Clause analysis.M Here again,
the court looked to Supreme Court precedent for guidance to determine
whether "qui tam relators wield[ed] so much governmental power that
they must be appointed in conformity with the Appointments Clause. 235
The Kelly Court turned to the "significant authority" test from Buckley v.
230. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997).
231. Id. at 662 (1997) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
232 Id. (noting "[g]enerally speaking, the term "inferior officer" connotes a
relationship with some higher ranking officer or officers below the President:
Whether one is an "inferior officer" depends on whether he has a superior.").
Justice Souter in his concurrence felt the need to clarify his opinion that the "mere
existence of a 'superior' is not dispositive." Id. at 668.
233. 9 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 1993). The Kelly court stated the following:
[qui tam relators] conduct litigation under the FCA with only the
resources of private plaintiffs. Furthermore, relators have no greater
authority to enforce the FCA than does the Attorney General, and under
the terms of the statute must yield to the government's assumption of
'primary responsibility' when it elects to intervene in a qui tam action.
When the government does not intervene, a relator retains primary
responsibility for the litigation, thus presenting what may seem a close
question under Buckley; but even in that situation, the relator's
responsibility only extends to a single case, and the relator's activities can
still be limited by the court upon a request of either the government or
the defendant.
Id. at 758 (citations and footnote omitted).
234. Craig, supra note 127, at 151.
235. Kelly, 9 F.3d at 757 (emphasis in original).
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Valeo 236 for its analyis of the FCA qui tam provisions under the
Appointments clause. However, instead of conducting a thorough analysis
under the guidelines pronounced in Buckley," or subsequent Supreme
Court interpretations of the Appointments Clause such as in Morrison ,38
the court simply made an extrinsic mental leap from its Take Care
Analysis to an Appointments Clause conclusion. Consequently, without
any detailed analysis, the court simply found it "impossible" that the
powers exercised by relators are so "significant" that they can only be
exercised by officers appointed in a manner consistent with Article II. 9
In brushing over the Buckley rational, The Ninth Circuit concluded that
Buckley's holding regarding the exercise of prosecutorial authority was
not an "unequivocal rule.' 2 ° Instead, the court found that Buckley should
be interpreted to mean that only persons who have "primary
responsibility" and "significant authority" to enforce a law through
litigation should be deemed officers.24' This statement is in complete
contravention of the plain language of the FCA, which states without
limitation: "[I]f the Government elects not to proceed with the action, the
person who initiated the action shall have the right to conduct the
action.,241
Nonetheless, the Kelly court concluded that a single relator does not
have "primary responsibility" and "significant authority" to meet the
definition of officer because: (1) he must yield when the government elects
to intervene; (2) his participation in the case may be further limited by the
236. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
237. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 124 - 140 (discussing the appointments clause).
23& See Morrison, 654 U.S. at 670 - 678 (discussing the appointments clause).
239. Kelly, 9 F.3d at 758
We have concluded that the Executive Branch retains
"sufficient control" of relators such that their exercise of
authority to sue on behalf of the United States does not
"impermissibly undermine" executive functions. In keeping with
that conclusion, we find it impossible to characterize the
authority exercised by relators as so "significant" that it must
only be exercised by officers appointed in the manner which
Article II, § 2, cl. 2 prescribes.
240. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 142-43.
241. Kelly, 9 F.3d at 758 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 126, 140).
242. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (2000).
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government after it intervenes; and (3) the relator's limited authority
extends only to one case."'
The court further bolstered this conclusion by noting "the fact that
relator's sue in the name of the government does not vest them with any
governmental powers."2" The court did recognize that cases where the
government does not intervene might present an ostensibly close question
under Buckley, however, it completely dismissed the issue because "the
relator's responsibility only extends to a single case. 11245
Again, the court missed the issue. Every argument made surrounding
the Appointments Clause, like the Take Care Clause, arises in cases where
the government has elected not to intervene. 246 Thus, the Ninth Circuit's
time spent theorizing that the relator must yield when the government
elects to intervene does not squarely address the issue raised.
When the government does not intervene, relators effectively appoint
themselves to enforce a civil statute.247 Consequently, they can easily be
compared to the members of the Federal Election Commission who were
enforcing a civil statute in Buckley." In Buckley, the Supreme Court
243. Id. (citation omitted). Courts examining this issue prior to Kelly, have
undertaken a similar analysis. In United States ex rel. Turong v. Northrop Corp.,
728 F. Supp. 615, 623-24 (D. Cal. 1989), the District Court found Buckley
inapplicable to private parties. In Turong, the court looked to two district court
cases, Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 652 F. Supp.
620, 626 (D. Md. 1987) and National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Outboard
Marine Corp., 692 F. Supp. 801, 817 (N.D. Ill. 1988), both of which held that the
citizen suit provisions of the Clean Air Act did not violate the doctrine of
separation of powers. This reasoning is not applicable to the FCA. Unlike citizen
suits, under the FCA, relators are not provided a statutory private right of action.
As the court in Natural Resources correctly noted it is perfectly appropriate for
Congress to establish and confer statutory rights on private parties. See 692 F.
Supp. at 816. Congress has not conferred any such private right on FCA relators.
244. Kelly, 9 F.3d at 758. This is an illogical conclusion. While relators may not
possess "government powers," relators are statutorily granted full prosecutorial
authority. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (2000); See also United States ex rel. Fallon
v. Accudyne Corp., 921 F. Supp. 611, 623 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (discussing how the
government can "control" the relators prosecutorial powers).
245. Kelly, 9 F.3d at 758.
246. See generally United States ex rel. Gilver v. Smith, 757 F. Supp. 172 (E.D.
Penn. 1991).
247. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 111.
248. Id. at 138 ("[t]he Commission's enforcement power, exemplified by its
discretionary power to seek judicial relief, is authority that cannot possibly be
regarded as merely in aid of the legislative function of congress.").
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stated that "there is no provision of the Constitution remotely providing
any alternative means for the selection of the members of the Commission
or for anybody like them.
2 49
It follows, based on the Supreme Court's analysis in Buckley that if
Congress could not reserve appointment power for itself, Congress cannot
take that a step further in reserving that power to a private citizen.50 The
Buckley court was clear that it considered the Federal Election
Commission's "enforcement power, exemplified by its discretionary power
to seek judicial relief, as authority that cannot possibly be regarded as
merely in aid of the legislative function of Congress." '25 Like the
Commission members in Buckley, FCA qui tam relators who make
discretionary decisions to enforce the law are wielding enforcement power
of the kind contemplated in Buckley.52
Most courts following the Kelly analysis of the Take Care Clause and
Appointments Clause do nothing more than complete a cursory analysis
of both issues.253 These courts basically come to the conclusion that Kelly
has adequately addressed the issue and does not need to be re-addressed
in detail. These decisions do not take into account a complete analysis of
Supreme Court precedent. It appears that everyone follows Kelly for fear
of breaking rank with the circuits and perhaps forcing this issue to be
addressed further.
5 4
249. Id. at 127 (emphasis added).
250. This argument goes against the previous discussion regarding citizen suits,
supra p. 23. It is worth re-emphasizing that in all citizen suits mentioned, the
Government has an unqualified power to intervene in the suit. Thus, while the
initial argument of reserving the decision to enforce the law in a private citizen are
the same, the governments unqualified right to intervene may be a saving factor.
251. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 138.
252 Id. at 140
We hold that these provisions of the Act vesting in the Commission
primary responsibility for conducting civil litigation in the courts of the
United States for vindicating public rights, violate Art. II, § 2, cl.2, of the
Constitution. Such functions may be discharged only by persons who are
'officers of the United States' within the language of this section.
Id.
253. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Phillips v. Pediatric Servs. Of Am., 123 F.
Supp. 2d 990, 994 (W.D.N.C. 2000); United States ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud
v. G.E., 41 F.3d 1032, 1041 (6th Cir. 1994).
254. See supra note 199 (discussing congressional pressure from Senator
Grassley on the executive branch to uphold the constitutionality of the qui tam
provisions of the FCA).
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V. CONCLUSION: AMENDING THE FCA TO CURE THE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS WILL NOT DEFEAT THE PURPOSE
OR THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ACT
Supreme Court jurisprudence has established the importance of
Executive prosecutorial discretion and appointment power. The FCA qui
tam provisions that authorize a private citizen to make prosecutorial
decisions and carry out law enforcement unduly alters the powers vested
in the Executive Branch. The enforcement of federal laws for the
protection of the public is among the most basic functions that the
Constitution bestows upon the Executive. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court has previously stuck down many federal acts, which have similar
provisions to the FCA on the basis of separation of powers."
Many courts have chosen to follow the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the
FCA qui tam provisions under Article II because it was the first circuit to
make a pronouncement on the issues. However, because it was the first
does not make it the best. Furthermore, some of the issues, such as the
reality of the Judiciary's ability to encroach on the Executive Branch's
ability to intervene have clearly presented themselves. A more careful
analysis of the FCA qui tam provisions cannot evade the clear
constitutional implications. Remedying these provisions will not alter the
effectiveness of the Act and will result in a more equal balance of power
among the branches.
The fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient and useful
in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it
is in violation of the Constitution.256 Department of Justice statistics
clearly show that the useful provisions of the FCA will not be threatened
or reduced by amending the FCA to eliminate the unconstitutional
provisions.
255. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (holding
that the Federal Election Commission could not constitutionally engage in law
enforcement traditionally dedicated to the Executive because Congress had taken
part in appointing its members); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (holding
provisions of the Gramm-Rudman Holdings Act, 2 U.S.C. 901 (2000), violated the
constitutional principal of separation of powers by permitting the execution of the
law to be vested in an officer answerable only to Congress).
256. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 728-732 (1986).
